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Introduction 
 
Although management buyouts are often studied from a purely financial perspective, their 
impact on employees has attracted significant levels of interest among academics, policy-
makers and the public in recent years. Indeed, debates around the implications of buyouts and 
private equity for employees have begun to appear relatively frequently in the mainstream and 
financial press, and there is now perhaps as much public interest in the impact of buyouts on 
employees as in the impact of other forms of corporate restructuring such as privatization, 
mergers and acquisitions. This is also reflective of the fact that management buyouts have 
become a global phenomenon, having risen to prominence first in the US during the early 
1980s, thereafter becoming prevalent in the UK and then more recently in mainland Europe.  
 
This chapter reviews what is currently known about the impact of buyouts on employees, 
focusing in particular on the implications for human resource management (HRM). We define 
HRM as the overall approach taken to employee management (in terms of whether the firm 
adopts an HRM strategy that seeks to develop workforce skills and loyalty, or seeks to 
minimize employment costs), and the implications of this overall approach for three broad 
interconnected policy areas: employment relations (which includes practices covering training, 
reward systems and managing employment change); work relations (which relates to the 
2 
 
organisation of labour such as team-based organisation, levels of task discretion and the 
management of health and safety); and industrial relations (which covers institutions for worker 
voice such as the role of trade unions and collective bargaining) (Gospel 2010).  
 
The chapter draws on this framework to summarise what is currently known about the impact 
of buyouts on HRM. It then considers the influence of buyout heterogeneity on HRM, 
exploring: buyouts led by insiders as opposed to buy-ins led by outsiders; the role of private 
equity funds; short-hold buyouts; and levels of indebtedness incurred by the firm. Reflecting 
the emergence of buyouts as a global phenomenon, the international evidence is considered 
where available, focusing in particular on the investor’s country of origin and the national 
institutional context in which the buyout is located. Finally, we outline an agenda for future 
research and consider some of the methodological challenges.  
 
HRM Strategy 
 
This section considers whether buyouts are associated with an overall approach to HRM 
strategy that seeks to develop workforce skills and loyalty, or seeks to minimize employment 
costs. In doing so, it explores: the perceived importance of HRM issues; resources devoted to 
managing employees; and the extent of adoption of high performance work systems that 
indicate an investment orientation.  
 
The perceived importance of HR issues and resources devoted to managing employees in 
buyouts 
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The impact of buyouts on HRM may be assessed by considering any subsequent changes to 
the overall approach or philosophy that managers in a firm adopt towards employee 
management and practices. One key issue here is the impact of buyouts on the perceived 
importance of HR issues within the firm, given that this may in turn affect the levels of 
expenditure and resources devoted to managing employees. With regard to this matter, a survey 
of managers in 148 UK buyouts completed in the period 1994–7 reported that in over half (54 
per cent) of buyouts the approach or philosophy to managing employees was significantly 
different post buyout (Bacon et al. 2004: 334), with a majority reporting that the importance of 
HRM issues had increased (51 per cent) or stayed the same (46 per cent), and only 4 per cent 
reporting it had decreased. The implications appeared to be generally positive for employees, 
with 44 per cent of respondents indicating an increase in resources devoted to managing 
employees, 47 per cent indicating that resources had stayed the same, and only 9 per cent 
indicating a decrease. This new and significant emphasis on HRM involved an increase in 
employee involvement, flexibility and training. As such, HRM changes following buyouts 
appear reflective of an emphasis on investment and growth rather than on seeking efficiencies 
to improve the performance of the firm via restructuring and cost reduction.  
 
Notable, however, is that an increased emphasis on HRM tends not to be the result of buyout 
investors becoming directly involved in HRM decision-making. For example, where private 
equity-backed buyouts are concerned, investors are mainly involved in the monitoring of 
financial and operating performance, and in developing the buyout’s business strategy. 
Operational HRM issues remain the responsibility of the buyout’s managers who work closely 
with investors to ensure that performance targets are met. Accordingly, managers report limited 
private equity investor involvement in decisions such as employment levels and payroll 
budgets, and only rare involvement in negotiations with trade unions (EVCA 2008: 3).  
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High performance work systems 
 
An alternative way of assessing the impact of buyouts on overall HRM strategy is to consider 
the adoption of high performance work systems (HPWS) aimed at improving firm performance 
by increasing employee abilities, motivation and opportunities to contribute (Appelbaum et al. 
2000). Practices associated with such systems include selective hiring, extensive training, 
employee involvement and teamworking, with extensive research conducted over the past 20 
years having identified a positive relationship between the adoption of an integrated set of such 
practices and firm performance (Combs et al. 2006). HPWS practices require a long-term 
approach to investing in employees and are unlikely to be adopted by firms with a short-term 
approach that seeks to minimize employment costs. Therefore, if such practices are abandoned 
or eschewed after buyout, this will provide a useful indicator of whether buyouts encourage a 
short-term cost minimization approach to HRM. 
 
Much of the evidence suggests, however, that buyouts have a positive impact on the adoption 
of HPWS, with research based on the aforementioned study of 148 UK buyouts and also on 45 
buyouts in the Netherlands suggesting increases in HPWS practices such as training, team-
based working and shared decision-making (Bacon et al. 2004, 2008; Bruining et al. 2005). 
Although these studies lack a control group of non-buyouts and rely on data from management 
respondents alone, the findings are consistent with a global study that indicates private equity-
owned buyouts are well-managed compared to other ownership forms in terms of using 
performance incentives to reward high-performing employees, and retraining or moving 
underperformers (Bloom et al. 2015).  
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Similar findings were also reported by EVCA’s (2008) survey of 190 private equity-backed 
buyouts from across Europe between 2002 and 2006. Increases were reported in a range of 
HPWS practices after buyout, including: regular team briefings (which increased from 71 per 
cent to 90 per cent); internal promotion as the norm to fill vacancies (increased from 72 per 
cent to 81 per cent); work organized around team-working for the majority of staff (increased 
from 68 per cent to 78 per cent); and a formal grievance procedure allowing employees to raise 
problems with management (increased from 70 per cent to 79 per cent). 
 
However, these studies also suggest that the impact of buyouts on HPWS adoption is affected 
by institutional context. In the UK/Netherlands surveys cited above, the increase in the rate of 
uptake of HPWS following buyout was greater in the UK (Bacon et al. 2004, 2008; Bruining 
et al. 2005). EVCA’s (2008) pan-European survey found that seven of the HPWS practices 
assessed increased significantly following buyouts in liberal market economies (the UK and 
Ireland) and six increased in Mediterranean Europe (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain). This 
compared with increases in the use of only two HPWS practices in coordinated market 
economies (Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland) and no significant 
changes in Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). These findings suggest 
that buyouts may have the effect of addressing the underinvestment in HPWS practices in less 
regulated countries (liberal market economies) while maintaining such investments in more 
regulated countries (coordinated market economies) where such practices are often legally 
required or are more common practice. 
 
Overall, therefore, the evidence suggests that buyouts, in their efforts to improve performance, 
encourage investments in HPWS rather than seeking to adopt a cost minimization approach. 
These findings are consistent with arguments that buyouts release firms from financial 
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constraints, thereby enabling them to grow and to modernize by adopting technological and 
operational upgrades (Boucly et al. 2011). The following sections consider whether these 
conclusions are also reflected in the research that has focused on the impact of buyouts on the 
three related HRM policy areas outlined above (employment relations, work relations and 
industrial relations). 
 
Employment relations 
 
Turning first to the impact of buyouts on employment relations, we concentrate here on training 
provision, pay systems and the management of employment change. 
 
Training provision 
Agency theory suggests that buyouts will reduce inefficient expenditure (Jensen 1989). 
Expenditure on workforce training may fall into this category if it is regarded as unlikely to 
add value for current owners or represents rent-seeking by employees. Similarly, wealth 
transfer arguments suggest that buyouts will seek to improve short-run financial performance 
by reducing training expenditure (Appelbaum et al. 2014: 58; Shleifer and Summers 1988: 33). 
From this perspective, buyouts are regarded as hostile takeovers in which new owners are 
willing to abrogate long-term contracts between managers and employees with regard to the 
expectation of continued training and development. This contrasts with the situation in public 
corporations, in which it is assumed that managers will seek to secure employee loyalty and 
discretionary effort by spending retained earnings on training and development, and promoting 
employees within internal labor markets. Buyouts are thus regarded by critics as a short-term 
approach to ownership, in contrast to the long-term horizon required by firms to invest in 
skilled employees and improve productivity (Haves, Vitols and Wilke 2014: 149). 
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Reflecting these theoretical arguments, reductions in training have been highlighted in a 
number of case studies of buyouts. For example, Ireland’s largest telecommunications provider 
Eirecom is reported to have reduced training following a buyout in 2005 (ITUC 2007: 29-30). 
Consistent with these arguments, politicians and trade unions have expressed concerns about 
the implications of buyouts for workforce training (PSE 2007: 97). Trade unions have 
concluded that following buyouts new owners stop investing in training in order to divert cash 
out of the firm (IUF/UITA/IUL 2007: 16), while government regulators and accounting bodies 
have expressed concern over the potential impact of buyouts on long-term investments in 
training (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2007: 13-14).  
 
The evidence on the impact of buyouts on training investment is, however, somewhat limited. 
Notwithstanding the case study accounts of reduced training investment following buyouts 
above, few studies to date have explored this matter systematically within the population of 
buyouts. Exceptions are the aforementioned studies of 148 UK and 45 Netherlands buyouts. 
These studies found managers reported increased training following buyouts alongside 
increases in other complementary HPWS practices such as team-based working and shared 
decision-making (Bacon et al. 2004, 2008; Bruining et al. 2005). Specifically, across both 
studies, 55 per cent of buyouts reported that the amount of training employees received had 
increased, 39 per cent that it had stayed the same, and only 6 per cent that it had decreased 
(Bacon et al. 2004: 335). Training provision increased in buyouts in both countries (Bruining 
et al. 2005) although it increased to a greater extent in UK buyouts than in Dutch buyouts, 
reflecting lower levels of training provision in the UK firms to begin with (Bacon et al. 2008). 
Broadly similar findings are reported by the aforementioned EVCA (2008) survey, which 
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found that 45 per cent of buyouts had increased expenditure on non-managerial employee 
training (adjusted for inflation) and just 3 per cent had reduced expenditure. 
 
These studies have some limitations, given that they rely on managers’ rather than employees’ 
reports of training levels following buyouts, and they do not contain a control group of non-
buyouts. However, in a recent study that drew on non-employer data and included a useful 
comparison between buyouts and a non-buyout control group, Bernstein and Sheen (2016) 
identified 118 private equity buyouts affecting 3,342 individual restaurants in Florida between 
2002 and 2012. Drawing on longitudinal health inspection data from the Florida Department 
of Business and Professional Regulation, the study identified increased store-level training in 
buyouts compared to non-buyouts.  
 
As such, there is no evidence within the more representative quantitative studies to suggest 
that, overall, buyouts result in reductions in workforce training. One possible explanation is 
that buyouts seek to improve performance in part by reducing hierarchical layers and removing 
tiers of middle management (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990). In such cases, increased training 
and ongoing development is required to enable shop-floor employees to take on duties 
previously performed by supervisors, and also to increase employees’ awareness of customer 
and business requirements (Van Neerven et al. 1996). Commensurately, shop-floor employees 
in buyouts report less supervision and increased discretion over work tasks (Amess et al. 2007). 
A further potential explanation relates to technological change. Agrawal and Tambe (2016) 
find that buyouts help address underinvestment in information technologies. This in turn is 
likely to require employee training in the use of such technologies. Either way, the increase in 
workforce skills training in buyouts identified in the research outlined above appears to be in 
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stark contrast to the lack of skills development in listed public companies traditionally 
attributed to short-term stock market fluctuations and quarterly reporting requirements. 
 
Pay systems 
 
The research on the impact of management buyouts on wage levels is reviewed in detail by 
Kevin Amess in this volume. Summarizing the main findings here, prior studies that draw on 
wage data from annual reports indicate a relative reduction in wages and lower average wages 
in private equity-backed buy-ins (Amess and Wright 2007). This might be viewed as 
commensurate with the adoption of a cost minimization HRM approach. However, a focus on 
the impact of buyouts on average wage levels obscures other important features of pay systems, 
such as the distribution of pay and benefits between employees at different grades and pay 
award criteria (Storrie 2014: vi). There is a paucity of studies exploring these broader issues.  
 
Lichtenberg and Siegel’s (1990) study is, however, an important exception. This study 
considers changes in wage levels for different occupational subgroups. Drawing on the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database containing annual data for over 20,000 
manufacturing establishments in the years 1972-1986, the analysis shows that wages for non-
production employees fell by 5.4 percent compared to a 3.6 percent increase in wages for 
production employees following buyouts. They attribute these changes to technological and 
operational upgrades that increase shop-floor participation in decision-making and facilitate 
the removal of bureaucratic layers. Similarly, Antoni et al.’s (2015) study of all employees in 
Germany linked to data on buyout deals to identify 190,000 employees affected by buyouts in 
the years 2002-2008 suggests that the negative wage effects of buyouts is concentrated in 
managerial grades (particularly among middle managers)- buyouts may address managerial 
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rent-seeking. It would be of greater concern if reductions in wages disproportionately affected 
less-skilled workers. However, the two studies described above suggest that this is not the case. 
More studies are nevertheless required before firm conclusions on the impact of buyouts on 
non-managerial and lower paid employees can be reached. 
 
As well as affecting pay rates, buyouts may also impact on pay systems within firms (Gospel 
and Pendleton 2014: 42). However, little is known about this matter. Arguably, buyouts will 
prefer performance-based incentive pay systems (Thornton 2007: 4) to help address 
underperformance by ensuring competent employees are rewarded properly (Cuny and Talmor 
2007: 631) and to avoid general wage increases that raise future labor costs. In line with this 
argument, prior studies have found an emphasis on performance monitoring and performance-
related pay in buyouts (Bacon et al. 2004; Malone 1989). For example, the aforementioned 
survey of 148 UK buyouts indicated that: the number of staff whose performance was appraised 
increased in over four in ten buyouts; a similar proportion reported an increase in the number 
of staff receiving merit pay; and one quarter of respondents (those in management-led 
employee buyouts) reported increases in the proportion of non-management employees owning 
shares (Bacon et al. 2004: 335). Similarly, the pan-European EVCA (2008) survey of 190 
private equity-backed buyouts identified the widespread introduction of incentive pay schemes 
including payment by results and profit-related pay, especially in buyouts in liberal market 
economies (the UK and Ireland). These findings are broadly consistent with those of Bloom et 
al. (2009: 9) that indicate private equity-backed buyouts focus on performance incentives to 
reward high-performing employees.  
 
It must be kept in mind, however, that the introduction of incentive pay systems may go hand-
in-hand with a reduction in the overall wage bill, given that such systems can be used to reward 
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a small number of high performing employees while keeping across-the-board wage increases 
to a minimum. For example, Appelbaum et al. (2013: 505) report reduced discretion for 
managers in buyouts to reward employees in performance evaluation systems as a result of 
downward pressure on the payroll. Little research has been conducted on this matter, however. 
More studies of performance-related pay in buyouts are thus required that focus not just on the 
adoption of incentive pay schemes but also on whether such systems are used to control wage 
costs.  
 
Finally, EVCA’s (2008) survey provides some notable observations on pension provision, 
showing that buyouts do not have negative implications for occupational pension schemes.  
Indeed, the proportion of LBOs offering such schemes increased from 76 per cent pre-buyout 
to 81 per cent post-buyout. Although pension schemes post-buyout have evolved more towards 
open defined-contribution money purchase schemes and away from defined-benefit salary-
related schemes, this reflects the trend across all firms. EVCA’s (2008) survey also found that 
the terms of occupational pension schemes did not generally deteriorate following buyouts, 
with only 1.4 per cent of LBOs reporting a material reduction of the security of pensions in the 
event of hypothetical insolvency. 
 
Managing employment change 
 
While the impact of buyouts on employment levels is considered elsewhere in this volume, less 
attention has been paid to how changes in employment levels are managed. Employers are 
generally encouraged to avoid compulsory redundancies when adjusting staffing levels and to 
provide help to employees if such redundancies are necessary. There is little evidence to date 
to suggest that buyouts deviate from this approach. Almost three-quarters of the 190 European 
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private equity-backed buyouts surveyed by EVCA (2008: 4) had made no redundancies. Where 
redundancies had been made, 65 per cent of buyouts offered enhanced severance packages, 46 
per cent provided counselling and 46 per cent offered outplacement assistance (ibid.). The 
research conducted to date on redundancies does not therefore suggest the existence of an overt 
cost minimization approach within buyouts. 
 
However, a number of further factors might also be important in assessing the management of 
employment change in buyouts. These include: the use and impact of redundancy consultation; 
the replacement of permanent with non-permanent employment contracts; outsourcing; and 
dismissal rates. No prior research has been conducted on these matters. Relatedly, prior studies 
have also not sought to assess employee perceptions of job insecurity in buyouts. Future studies 
may usefully address such matters to enhance current understanding of the management of 
employment change in buyouts.  
 
Overall therefore, where employment relations practices are concerned, there is no evidence to 
suggest that buyouts have negative implications for employee training, and no consistent 
evidence of negative implications for pay systems and the management of employment change. 
Although more research is needed on these latter two issues (particularly in terms of whether 
the use of incentive pay systems in buyouts is aimed at controlling wage costs, and on whether 
the manner in which redundancies and workforce change is handled) there is nothing within 
the existing research on employment relations practices in LBOs to suggest the adoption of a 
cost minimization approach to HRM.  
 
Work relations 
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The second of the three broad HRM policy areas outlined above on which buyouts might have 
an influence is work relations (the organization of labor such as team-based organization, levels 
of task discretion and the management of health and safety, for example). As suggested earlier, 
buyouts appear to result in shop-floor reorganization (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990) with 
HPWS practices such as team-based working and shared decision-making being increasingly 
adopted post buyout (Bacon et al. 2004; Bruining et al. 2005). EVCA’s (2008) pan-European 
survey reported increased use of regular team briefings, team-working for the majority of staff, 
flexible job descriptions and flexible working time arrangements for most employees to 
balance work and family life. As noted earlier, these changes were particularly evident in 
liberal market countries and Mediterranean Europe where such practices are less commonly 
adopted in the economy overall. 
 
In terms of the implications of the greater adoption of such practices in buyouts for employees, 
there has been considerable debate in the broader HRM literature over whether these practices 
result in improved job quality or an increase in work intensity and stress (Ramsay et al. 2000). 
It is similarly open to debate whether an increased adoption of such practices in buyouts is 
reflective of a cost minimization approach to HRM which might be expected to have negative 
employee outcomes.  
 
However, as critics of buyouts themselves acknowledge (Appelbaum and Batt 2014: 194) there 
is a paucity of representative quantitative data on this matter. Critics have instead relied on 
selected case studies to argue that where buyouts divest from less profitable operations, this 
results in the adoption of work relations practices that breach long-term contracts between 
managers and employees with regard to the conditions of work (Appelbaum et al. 2013). As 
such, employees, fearful for their jobs, might be expected to accept changes that result in work 
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intensification and a deterioration of working conditions (Appelbaum et al. 2014: 61; Clark 
2016; Gospel and Pendleton 2014: 26; ITUC 2007: 28; Thornton 2007; Watt 2008: 557). 
According to the ITUC (2007: 29) this may involve accepting extra shifts and the forfeit or 
postponement of annual leave (ITUC 2007: 29). Workers at the Kion buyout, for example, 
reportedly worked extra shifts each week to increase the utilization of production lines (PSE 
2007: 111). Changes to work relations practices in buyouts may therefore be suggestive of a 
calculative, cost minimization HRM approach in buyouts. To explore this matter further, in the 
following discussion we consider four different work relations practices in buyouts: task 
discretion; control over the pace of work; participation in decision-making; and health and 
safety.  
 
Turning first to task discretion, Rodrigues and Child (2010: 1331) predict that buyouts may 
result in ‘an intensification of work and moves towards low-discretion work roles’ for non-
management employees. In support of this, where managerial grades are concerned, buyout 
critics highlight cases in which task discretion has reduced for managers, such as more limited 
discretion for line managers to reward exceptional contribution in performance evaluations 
systems at Mervyns, and reduced discretion for repertoire managers and artists at EMI 
(Appelbaum et al. 2013: 505 and 508). 
 
There is, however, limited evidence that this has occurred for non-management employees. For 
example, drawing on UK matched data from 1,959 ﬁrms and 27,263 employees, Amess et al. 
(2007) examined the impact of buyouts on task discretion and supervision. Task discretion was 
defined as the amount of influence an employee perceives they have over their range of tasks, 
pace of work and how they do their work. Employees in buyouts reported higher task discretion 
than their counterparts in non-buyouts (although this was limited to workplaces with a higher 
15 
 
proportion of craft and skilled service workers). These findings may be explained by an 
increase (as outlined above) in decision-making responsibility being devolved to employees as 
a result of reductions in the number of supervisory staff (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990).  
 
Turning to employees’ control over the pace of work, this might be expected to reduce in 
buyouts given that workforce reductions are likely to require the remaining employees to take 
on extra job tasks (Rodrigues and Child 2010: 1327). Following the buyout at the Automobile 
Association, for example, it is reported that workloads and unpaid overtime increased, the time 
for toilet trips and meal breaks was restricted, and last job working time was extended for 
roadside rescuers (Clark 2016: 249; Rodrigues and Child 2010: 1328). However, these findings 
do not concur with research undertaken on the broader population of buyouts, with Amess et 
al. (2007), as reported above, showing that employee control over their pace of work appears 
greater in buyouts than non-buyouts, at least for craft and skilled service workers. 
 
Participation in decision-making might also be expected to change following buyouts. Critics 
of buyouts suggest that new owners often make key decisions without discussion with the 
affected employees (Appelbaum et al. 2013: 515). However, at the shop-floor level this is not 
easily reconciled with the evidence outlined above that employees in buyouts perceive 
themselves to have greater influence (Amess et al. 2007). It is possible, therefore, that 
employee participation increases in relation to decisions affecting their job tasks on the shop-
floor, but decreases in relation to decisions concerning the future of the firm made at higher 
levels.    
 
Employee health and safety and wellbeing may also suffer as a result of the uncertainty and 
stress generated by ownership change and restructuring. For example, the buyouts of Telemig 
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in Brazil, and Debenhams and the Automobile Association in the UK are described as having 
resulted in ‘unbearable stress for some employees’ (Rodrigues and Child 2010: 1327). 
However, no systematic nationally representative studies have been conducted to assess 
whether employees in buyouts report lower levels of work-related well-being. With regard to 
health and safety, the only available nationally representative study does not support the 
arguments within the case studies reported above as it reports that workplace injury rates 
decline following buyouts of publicly-traded firms (Cohn et al. 2016). Furthermore, studies 
based on nationally-representative US data (Cohn et al. 2016: 14) suggest that buyouts do not 
result in longer working hours that may have negative implications for stress or workplace 
health and safety. 
 
It is evident from the above discussion that greater research on the impact of buyouts on work 
relations is needed in a number of areas. For example, there is little explanation currently for 
why buyouts appear to engender greater task discretion for non-managerial employees but 
lower task discretion for managers/ professionals. Similarly, only limited research has been 
conducted on employees’ control over the pace of work (and the implications of this for work 
intensification and time pressure), and the research that has been undertaken reveals 
inconsistent results. Additional studies are also required on employee participation (exploring 
in particular employee participation in decisions taken at different organizational levels 
following buyouts) and on employee wellbeing. However, beyond the conclusions drawn from 
selective case studies, and notwithstanding this need for further research, there is little evidence 
within the research conducted to date to suggest that changes in work relations in buyouts 
reflect a cost minimization approach to HRM or have negative overall effects for employees. 
 
Industrial relations 
17 
 
 
The third HRM policy area under exploration here on which buyouts might have an impact is 
industrial relations. With regard to this issue, trade unions are among the most vocal critics of 
buyouts, and they have suggested that buyouts seek to marginalize their influence by 
downgrading arrangements for joint consultation and collective bargaining (Gospel and 
Pendleton 2014: 26; IUF/UITA/IUL 2007: 5; Watt 2008: 557), thereby threatening the 
European social model of worker participation (Vitols 2008). Union derecognition is even 
considered by some critics to be an important motivation for private equity buyouts (ITUC 
2007; Work Foundation 2007: 26). Frequently cited examples of derecognition following 
buyouts include the withdrawal from collective bargaining and union recognition disputes at 
the Automobile Association, National Car Parks and Kettle Chips (Clark 2009a,b, 2016; Evans 
and Habbard 2008; ITUC 2007; TUC 2007). 
 
These examples contrast, however, with other cases where private equity has worked closely 
with union representatives in US and Australian buyouts (Beeferman 2009; Westcott 2009) 
and to rescue British firms in distress during the 1970s/80s (Wright 1984). They also contrast 
with survey evidence suggesting that buyouts do not typically have negative implications for 
union representation, with few changes to representation being reported in the first wave of UK 
buyouts (Bacon et al. 2004; Wright et al. 1990, 2009). EVCA’s (2008) pan-European survey 
also reports little change regarding union recognition, membership density, management 
attitudes to trade union membership, the terms and conditions subject to joint regulation and 
the frequency of consultation. For example, two-thirds of managerial respondents stated that 
they were either in favor or neutral towards union membership, and on average, the terms and 
conditions subject to joint regulation increased following private equity-backed buyouts, 
specifically with regard to distributive issues such as rates of pay, hours of work and staffing 
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plans (ibid.). Additionally, use of consultative committees increased from 50 per cent before 
the buyout to 63 per cent after the buyout. Managers also reported an increase in the influence 
of consultative committees following buyouts. 
 
There are, therefore, considerable differences in the conclusions drawn from the case study and 
survey evidence regarding the impact of buyouts on industrial relations. While the case study 
evidence suggests that the changes that have occurred in industrial relations might be viewed 
as commensurate with a cost minimization approach to HRM, this is not the case where the 
survey evidence is concerned. This suggests that more nationally representative studies are 
required that include a non-buyout control group to help distinguish between the impact of 
buyouts and the broader decline of union influence in many countries.  
 
Summarizing the chapter thus far, the representative evidence gathered to date does not, on 
balance, indicate that buyouts result in a cost minimizing HRM approach. Although individual 
cases may highlight some negative changes to certain aspects of employment relations, work 
relations and industrial relations, these do not appear to be the case for the average firm subject 
to a buyout in the broader population of firms. It is possible, however, that the implications for 
employees may differ between types of buyouts, according to the investor’s country of origin, 
or in specific institutional contexts. The following section explores this possibility. 
 
Different types of buyouts, investor country of origin and institutional context 
 
Buyout Types 
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Turning first to buyout heterogeneity, while buyouts overall may not be associated with a cost 
minimizing approach to HRM, buyouts with specific features may have particularly negative 
implications. Sources of buyout heterogeneity include whether the buyout is: investor or non-
investor led; private equity-backed; short or long-term; and has a high or low debt ratio.  
 
The most frequently considered aspect of the impact of buyout heterogeneity on HRM relates 
to the contrast between insider and outsider buyouts. Insider buyouts include management 
buyouts, management-employee buyouts and employee buyouts. Outsider buyouts include 
investor-buyouts and management buy-ins. These different forms of buyouts may vary 
considerably in terms of their implications for HRM. From a theoretical point of view, the 
wealth transfer perspective suggests that outsiders will lack an established relationship with 
employees and will therefore be more likely to abrogate long-term contracts between managers 
and employees (Shleifer and Summers 1988). By contrast, incumbent managers in insider 
buyouts appear to be more inclined to continue established relationships with employees, and 
hence the approach they take to employee management is less likely to change post buyout. 
Supporting this argument, Bacon et al. (2004: 336) demonstrate that management buyouts are 
indeed less likely to make changes in their approach to managing employees than outsider 
buyouts. In addition, employment reductions are more marked in outsider than insider buyouts 
(Amess and Wright 2007). 
 
However, not all the evidence suggests that outsider buyouts have more negative HRM 
implications than insider buyouts. For example, Bacon et al. (2008: 1423) show that outsider 
buyouts are more likely than insider buyouts (management buyouts and management-employee 
buyouts) to adopt new HPWS practices. Thus, the conclusions drawn from the research on the 
implications of insider and outsider buyouts on HRM remain inconsistent.  
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Turning to a second feature of buyout heterogeneity, buyouts conducted by private equity firms 
have attracted particular attention in recent debates, with several studies having sought to 
compare the effects of private equity-backed and non-private equity-backed buyouts. These 
studies are particularly helpful given that much of the recent policy debate has concerned the 
regulation of private equity funds rather than buyouts per se.  
 
In theorizing why the effects of private equity-backed and non-private equity-backed buyouts 
on HRM may differ, private equity funds are often portrayed as active investors who are 
involved in developing strategic plans, taking seats on the board and monitoring strategy 
implementation. Investor activism is central to explaining how buyouts may address agency 
problems in public corporations and help improve firm performance. Such activism might take 
at least three forms, all of which have potential consequences for HRM. The first relates to 
direct investor involvement in financial control (e.g. monitoring financial performance and 
restructuring debt financing). The second relates to involvement in talent management to 
improve leadership (e.g. firing underperforming managers and hiring serial entrepreneurs 
known to the private equity firm). The third relates to investor involvement in operational HR 
issues (e.g. payroll budgets and the implementation of incentive pay systems).  
 
However, it is less clear whether these forms of investor activism that characterize private 
equity-backed buyouts will result in a cost minimization approach to HRM or a more 
developmental approach. The empirical evidence on this is mixed, with some research 
suggesting that the effect is largely neutral. For example, Bacon et al. (2008) report that private 
equity-backed buyouts are less likely than non-private equity-backed buyouts to report 
increased use of HPWS practices. However, they do not on average reduce the usage of these 
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practices, and they do adopt additional HPWS practices in instances where investors are more 
heavily involved in HRM issues. Furthermore, financial monitoring of buyouts is positively 
associated with increases in the perceived importance of HRM issues after the buyout. This 
finding could be considered surprising given that financial monitoring might be expected to 
result in downward pressure on employment costs. Where investor involvement in talent 
management is concerned, this may have both positive and negative effects. Hiring serial 
entrepreneurs may have positive knowledge transfer effects as new managers may introduce 
more sophisticated HRM practices. In line with this argument, investor involvement in talent 
management is positively associated with the percentage of employees working in formally 
designated teams (ibid.). In contrast, negative effects may follow from hiring managers that 
have less loyalty to employees, with evidence that investor involvement in talent management 
is negatively associated with employee involvement practices and the percentage of employees 
receiving profit-related pay (Bacon et al. 2004: 337-40).  
 
As such, the HRM implications of the investor activism typical to private equity buyouts appear 
somewhat mixed. While some of the evidence suggests that active private equity investors 
provide buyouts with managerial skills and expertise on HRM issues beyond the provision of 
financial acumen (and this may result in a more developmental HRM approach being taken), 
not all of the research supports this argument. 
 
Turning to the HRM implications of short-term ownership, less research has been conducted 
on this matter. However, critics have argued that buyouts are a short-term form of ownership 
with a corresponding ‘disinclination to invest in longer-term, intangible assets such as human 
resources’ (Gospel and Pendleton 2014: 27). This might particularly be the case for short-hold 
‘quick flip’ buyouts in which investors seek to exit from the buyout within a short time period. 
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In accordance with this argument, Bacon et al. (2012) found that a longer intended time to exit 
at the time of the buyout deal is positively associated with the adoption of HPWS practices. No 
further studies have, however, addressed this issue.  
 
Finally in terms of aspects of buyout heterogeneity, buyout critics have highlighted the negative 
effects of high debt levels incurred on buyout. High leverage encourages an emphasis on 
efficiencies rather than investment and growth (Kaplan and Strömberg 2008), given that debt 
repayment limits free cash flow for investment (Jensen 1989). As such, high debt levels commit 
reserves that may otherwise ‘be used for investment in the sustainable development of the 
enterprise and innovation or human resource management and training’ (PSE 2007: 20). 
However, although debt is frequently highlighted as a key aspect of buyouts, no prior studies 
have considered the implications of buyout debt levels for HRM.  
 
Overall, therefore, there is no consistent evidence that the forms of buyouts that critics argue 
have particularly deleterious effects (investor-led buyouts; private equity--backed buyouts; 
short-term buyouts; and high debt ratio buyouts) are associated with a cost minimization 
approach to HRM. The research is limited, however, suggesting further studies are needed 
before firmer conclusions can be reached. 
 
Country of origin and institutional context  
 
As buyouts have become a global phenomenon many investors now operate beyond their 
country of origin and acquire firms in a wide range of national institutional contexts. However, 
only rare assessments have been conducted of whether the impact of buyouts on HRM varies 
depending on the investors’ country of origin. Foreign investors may be more likely than 
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domestic investors to introduce changes in buyouts for a range of reasons, including: different 
frames of reference with regard to management ideas; greater distance from employees and 
hence potentially less identification with them; and reduced susceptibility to host country 
norms or established practice. In addition, investors from specific countries may carry greater 
threat to employees. For example, Anglo-Saxon investors (e.g. from the US or UK) might be 
expected to threaten the established practices of the firms they acquire in coordinated market 
economies in mainland Europe. Current evidence suggests, however, that Anglo-Saxon and 
foreign investor involvement are not significantly related to a change in HPWS practices after 
buy-out (Bacon et al. 2012). Although the involvement of Anglo-Saxon investors is positively 
associated with the extension of performance-related pay schemes to cover more employees, 
this is less likely when the buyout occurs in non-Anglo-Saxon countries (ibid.: 621). 
 
Also with regard to institutional context, as mentioned earlier, the main increases in the uptake 
of HPWS practices post buyout appear to be in liberal-market countries (EVCA 2008) in which 
stock market pressure may have deterred the widespread adoption of such practices, and a more 
permissive set of labor laws have not required firms to adopt them (Bacon et al. 2008, 2012; 
Bruining et al. 2005). In countries where HPWS practices are more commonly adopted there 
is no evidence that buyouts lead to a reduction in their use (EVCA, 2008). 
 
A recent study of the impact of private equity on employment in France reached different 
conclusions (Guery et al. 2017). Drawing on data from the nationally representative Enquete 
Relations Professionnelles et Négociations d’Entreprise (REPONSE), the analysis revealed 
that establishments owned by foreign private equity investors were more likely to report 
employment decline in the previous three years, specifically declines in non-production 
workers, when compared to establishments owned by French private equity investors and non-
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private equity owned establishments. These findings are attributed to the role of state 
involvement in French private equity firms, with public investment groups adopting social as 
well as financial objectives. It is also possible, however, that the findings reflect selection 
effects whereby foreign investors may be more likely to acquire firms that needed turning 
around. 
 
Future research 
 
As the above discussion suggests, considerable additional research is needed in several areas 
to further understanding of the implications of buyouts for HRM. Turning to the first of the 
three HRM policy areas (employment relations) few studies have, as outlined above, 
systematically evaluated the implications of buyouts for training provision. Further studies on 
this issue would provide a useful test of the willingness of buyouts to make long-term 
investments. Any reductions to training provision may be particularly concerning from a public 
policy perspective given the goal of most governments to increase skill levels in the labor 
market. To enhance the validity of the findings, studies should also assess training provision 
reported by employees rather than just employers to guard against potential response bias. 
 
Additional studies are also required with regard to pay systems. These studies need to compare 
the adoption of incentive pay systems in buyouts and non-buyouts, given that the adoption of 
incentive pay following buyouts identified in the extant research may merely reflect increased 
usage of such practices among firms as a whole. Further research is also needed to identify 
whether incentive pay systems are being used in buyouts to control overall wage levels. 
Incentive pay systems potentially also allow management to exercise control over wage costs 
by shifting risk onto employees. During the good times bonuses are paid out, while during bad 
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times bonuses are not paid out. The other side of the argument is that lower wage costs during 
bad times means there is less pressure on management to shed jobs. The impacts on incentive 
pay on employees therefore needs careful assessment. 
 
There also remains a paucity of research on the management of employment change in buyouts. 
While studies to date have focused on the implications of buyouts for employment levels, future 
studies also need to assess the manner in which workforce reductions in buyouts are handled 
(whether via redundancy and dismissal as opposed to natural wastage, for example), and also 
whether buyouts increase the use of non-permanent employment contracts and outsourcing.    
 
With regard to the second of the HRM policy areas outlined above (work relations), as 
demonstrated above, additional research is required to extend knowledge on the impact of 
buyouts on task discretion, the pace of work, participation in decision-making, and health and 
safety. An assessment of these matters would facilitate greater understanding of the broader 
impact of buyouts on employee job quality. 
 
With regard to the third HRM policy area (industrial relations), future studies might explore 
whether there are changes in the issues on which management normally negotiate, consult or 
inform worker representatives. These studies should ideally combine data collected from 
employers and worker representatives in order to verify whether the perceptions of increased 
consultation reported by managers in prior studies are shared by worker representatives. 
Studies should also include a non-buyout control group to help distinguish between the impact 
of buyouts and broader secular changes (the decline of union influence, for example). 
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Across many of the issues outlined above on which further research is required, greater 
consideration is needed of whether managers and non-managerial employees are equally 
affected by changes in HRM following buyouts. Any negative changes that disproportionately 
affect less-skilled and low wage workers would be concerning as their prospects for future 
employment and earnings are lower (Appelbaum and Batt 2014: 199). Important issues from 
this perspective include: whether buyouts have differential effects on training provision for 
managerial and non-managerial employees; whether a greater proportion of non-managerial 
than managerial pay is at risk under incentive schemes; and whether non-managerial as 
opposed to managerial employees are particularly at risk of job insecurity and reductions to 
intrinsic job quality.  
 
In addition, little is known about the impact of buyouts on employee attitudes. This is surprising 
given the wealth transfer perspective highlights the potential for breaches of both explicit and 
implicit long-term contracts (Shleifer and Summers 1988). Future studies on employee 
attitudes might therefore include consideration of whether employees perceive sufficient 
opportunities for training and development; whether they are satisfied with their pay; whether 
they feel adequately represented at work; and their satisfaction with levels of job security, job 
quality, and opportunities to influence decisions. 
 
Future studies should also consider these effects in different types of buyouts. While a number 
of studies have sought to provide comparisons between insider and outsider buyouts, the 
findings reached by these studies on the impact of such buyouts on HRM is inconclusive, 
suggesting further research is warranted. The more limited research on private equity-backed 
buyouts and short- versus long-hold buyouts is similarly inconclusive, thus suggesting a need 
for further research. Also, no prior research has explored the implications of buyout debt ratios 
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for HRM, suggesting this would be a fruitful avenue for future studies. In addition, future 
studies should also continue to explore country of origin effects and the role of institutional 
context. 
  
Many of these issues pose significant challenges in terms of the collection and analysis of 
available data. Whereas it is possible to draw on existing datasets to consider overall 
employment and pay data, most HRM issues are not consistently or routinely included in 
annual reports. Prior studies have therefore relied on surveys of buyouts completed by a 
management respondent. However, low response rates and response bias may affect the 
findings, while case studies appear a poor substitute given their lack of representativeness. One 
way forward would be to make greater use of government surveys that cover HRM issues and 
include matched employer-employee data. Examples include the British Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey and the French REPONSE. Buyouts may be identified by 
linking these data to existing buyout datasets. As these buyout datasets also include data on 
buyout characteristics, they also provide the potential to explore HRM issues in different types 
of buyouts.  
 
The impact of buyouts on the HRM outcomes covered in this chapter such as training, pay, job 
security and job quality is likely to remain of interest given the importance of these outcomes 
from economic and social perspectives. It is to be hoped that future studies as called for here 
will provide an increasingly reliable basis on which to inform public policy debates on the 
impact of buyouts on these outcomes. 
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